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Computational Models to Detect Radiation in Urban Environments: An Application
of Signal Processing Techniques and Neural Networks to Radiation Data Analysis
Jose Nicolas Gachancipa
Abstract
Radioactive sources, such as uranium-235, are nuclides that emit ionizing radiation, and which can be
used to build nuclear weapons. In public areas, the presence of a radioactive nuclide can present a risk to
the population, and therefore, it is imperative that threats are identified by radiological search and response
teams in a timely and effective manner. In urban environments, such as densely populated cities, radioactive
sources may be more difficult to detect, since background radiation produced by surrounding objects and
structures (e.g., buildings, cars) can hinder the effective detection of unnatural radioactive material. This article presents a computational model to detect radioactive sources in urban environments, which uses signal
processing techniques to identify radiation signatures. Moreover, the model uses artificial neural networks to
identify types of radiation sources, classifying them as innocuous or harmful, and discerning between weapons-grade material and radioactive isotopes used in medical or industrial settings.

Introduction

classifying them as innocuous or harmful, and
discerning between weapons-grade material and
radioactive isotopes used in medical or industrial
settings.

Radioactive sources are nuclides that emit
ionizing radiation. Some of these sources, such
as uranium-235 (235U) and plutonium-239
(239Pu), can be used to build nuclear weapons,
while some others, such as caesium-137 (137Cs)
and technetium-99 (99mTc), are often used for
medical or industrial applications. In public areas
and events, the presence of a radioactive source can
present a risk to the population, and therefore, it is
imperative that threats are identified by radiological
search and response teams. The purpose of this
project is to build a computational model capable
of detecting and characterizing radiation sources,
using machine learning methods and statistical
analysis. Specifically, the project explores the use
of signal processing techniques and artificial neural
networks for the analysis of radiation data.

This project builds on previous research
conducted by the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL), a US government laboratory
managed by the Department of Energy (DoE).
The dataset used in the project was made publicly
available in the paper “Data for training and
testing radiation detection algorithms in an urban
environment” (Ghawaly, et al., 2020). Moreover,
some of the deep learning techniques previously
implemented for radioactive isotope classification
are discussed by Galib, et.al., in the paper “A
comparative study of machine learning methods
for automated identification of radioisotopes
using NaI gamma-ray spectra” (Galib, Bhowmik,
Avachat, & Lee, 2021), and by Gomez-Fernandez
et.al., in the paper “Isotope identification using
deep learning: An explanation” (Gomez-Fernandez,
et al., 2021).

The dataset used to develop and test the
model was generated by the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory and is composed of simulated
environments containing a variety of radiological
sources. The computational model detects
unnatural radiation events in urban environments,
which may have disastrous consequences if
undetected or ignored. Moreover, the model
identifies the types of radioactive sources,
1
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Data and Methodology

4.
Cobalt (60Co): 60Co is produced
artificially in nuclear reactors. Cobalt is often used
in medical and industrial applications. Exposure to
large amounts of 60Co can cause skin burns and
cancer (National Center for Environmental Health
(NCEH), 2018).

The dataset used to build the
computational model was generated by the Oak
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) using a
stochastic-simulation code based on Monte-Carlo
methods, called MAVRIC. The details of the
simulations used to train and test the model are
explained by Ghawaly, et.al. in “Data for training
and testing radiation detection algorithms in an
urban environment”, the article that made the
dataset publicly available. The dataset was created
with a variety of simulated street models, each
having a different radiological source, building
layout, and building material. Moreover, the
shielding of radioactive sources was modified
for each simulation, so that more possible urban
radiation scenarios would be covered. The six
radiological sources included in the dataset are the
following:

5.
Technetium (99mTc): Technetium-99 is
also a product of nuclear reactors and can be found
in nuclear waste. 99mTc is a modified isotope of
Technetium-99. The 99mTc isotope has a very
short life (5-6 hours) and does not remain inside
human bodies for long periods of time. Hence, it is
widely used for medical purposes (EPA, 2017).
6.
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) +
Technetium (99mTc): A combination of sources 1
and 5.
The simulations in the dataset consisted
of moving a Sodium Iodide (NaI) radiation
detector along a simulated street (see Figure 1)
while collecting energy data. Each simulation in
the dataset contains a single radiological source.
Moreover, small or moving objects (i.e., cars,
people, traffic lights, etc.) were ignored and not
included in the simulations. The dataset contains a
total of 25,540 simulations, split between training
and testing data. In this study, a subset of 4,800
simulations (800 per source) was used to train
and test the models. The dataset files contain data
of the frequency and strength of the radiation
events. Each row in the data files is a radiation
event described by two features: the time elapsed
since the last photon was detected, in seconds, and
the photon energy measured in kiloelectron-volts
(keV). For the training data, the target time, which
is the time at which the radiation detector is closest
to the radioactive source, is also given.

1.
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU):
Uranium (U) is an element often found in nature
in the form of the 238U and 235U isotopes. 238U
cannot sustain a fission chain reaction, while 235U
is the only fissile isotope which exists in nature.
HEU is an enriched form of Uranium (composed
of at least 20% of the 235U isotope) and can be
used to build nuclear weapons (US Department of
Energy, 2001).
2.
Weapons grade plutonium (WGPu):
Plutonium-239 (239Pu) is obtained when a
uranium-238 (238U) isotope absorbs one neutron
and decays, which occurs often in nuclear reactors.
WGPu is composed of at least 93% 239Pu
(Makhijani, 1997).
3.
Iodine (131I): Iodine is often used for
medical applications. Specifically, it is used to
treat thyroid cancer. The 131I isotope is produced
through fission in nuclear reactors, and it is widely
abundant, cheap, and easy to create (Washington
State Department of Health, 2003).
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are not identified as a threat by an algorithm
(US Department of Energy, 2001). Furthermore,
radiation detection algorithms must avoid the
non-detection of harmful sources (false negatives),
which can compromise the population’s safety.
The goal of an urban radiation detection
algorithm is to detect, identify, and locate a
radiological source, while extracting KUT noise
and minimizing the occurrence of false-negatives
and/or false-positive alerts. This project explores
two algorithms to detect and classify radioactive
events, respectively. The detection algorithm
utilizes signal processing methods to expose energy
deviations in the data that indicate the presence
of a radioactive source, while the characterization
algorithm uses artificial neural networks to classify
isotopes.
1.

Radiation Detection
Signal processing is a subfield of electrical
engineering focused on the analysis of data from
physical events (Apolinário & Diniz, 2014).
The subfield is often applied to radiation-related
domains, such as medical imaging, astronomy, and
radiation detection (Spieler, 2001). In this project,
signal processing methods are used to detect
radioactive sources based on their energy levels.
Figure 2 shows the four-step process used by the
model to perform radiation detection.

Figure 1: 3D & 2D views of a stree-model comprised of brick buildings
(red), granite (tan), asphalt (white), and soil (green).
Source: (Ghawaly, et al., 2020).

The task of detecting a radioactive source
from urban environment data is not trivial.
Buildings and other surrounding structures
produce natural background radiation, which
is predominantly composed of potassium
(K), uranium (U), and Thorium (T), and is
commonly referred as the KUT background.
Urban environments often have high levels of
KUT radiation. Thus, it is difficult to differentiate
radiation produced by anomalous sources from the
natural (KUT) background in such environments
(Anderson-Cook, et al., 2020).
Moreover, when detecting unnatural
radiation, it is also important to identify the types
of radiation sources, since some of these sources are
harmless or do not present a significant risk. For
example, from the six radiological sources included
in the dataset, 131I and 99mTc are often used
for medical purposes. Therefore, it is important
to recognize such sources as innocuous (at least
when they are present in low quantities), so that
people undergoing radiation medical treatment

Figure 2: Radiation detection process using detrending and filtering
techniques.

3

Computational Models to Detect Radiation in Urban Environments
Beyond Vol. 5
The first step in the proposed method
is the data pre-processing step. As previously
mentioned, the raw data contains the time elapsed
since the last photon was detected, in seconds,
and the photon energy measured in kiloelectronvolts (keV). Therefore, the raw data is an unevenly
spaced time series, since the spacing between
radiation events is not constant. In order to
allow the signal-processing algorithm to treat the
radiation data as a signal, the input data needs to
be converted to a time-series with evenly spaced
events. Thus, the data pre-processing stage involves
finding the average photon energy detected by
the NaI scintillator in each 10-millisecond time
interval. The resulting dataset contains an evenly
spaced time-series resembling a 100 Hz signal (100
radiation events per second, at intervals of 0.01s
each).

Figure 3: Example of data detrending using a first order polynomial.

Once the data is detrended, a Butterworth
filter is applied to isolate frequencies in the
signal, which can indicate the presence of a
radioactive source such as technetium or uranium.
Butterworth filters are a signal processing method
to attenuate or remove frequencies that are
above/below a predefined cutoff. Low-pass filters
attenuate frequencies above the cutoff, while highpass filters diminish frequencies below the defined
cutoff value. For example, let us consider a 10 Hz
signal superimposed over a 1 Hz frequency (see
Figure 4). Upon applying a low-pass Butterworth
filter with a cutoff of 5 Hz, the 10 Hz frequency
is removed. Conversely, applying a high-pass
Butterworth filter with the same 5 Hz cutoff would
remove the 1 Hz frequency from the signal.

The second step is detrending, which
consists of removing the trend from the data
by applying polynomial subtraction. Trends in
data are usually the effect of external factors
and should be removed before the analysis. For
example, in datasets collected over long periods
of time, detrending is often necessary to remove
the seasonal/cyclical effects from the data. In the
case of radiation data, detrending may be useful to
remove external factors such as KUT background
or the detector’s built-in noise. By removing the
trend from the data, it is possible to visualize strong
deviations from the linear trend that may indicate
the presence of an unnatural radiation source.
One of the parameters that must be defined
for detrending is the order of the polynomial.
In this project, the standard approach of a
least-squares fitting algorithm with a 1st order
polynomial is used to remove the trend from the
1000 Hz signal. Such method is visualized in
Figure 3. It is important to note that once the
data is detrended, the resulting energy signal is still
measured in kiloelectron-volts (kEv), but rather
than representing the total energy collected by
the radiation detector, it represents the energydeviation from the best line of fit.
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Figure 4: Overview of low-pass (top) and high-pass (bottom) Butterworth
filters with a cutoff frequency of 5 Hz applied on a signal of two
superimposed frequencies (1 Hz and 10 Hz).

High-pass and low-pass filters can be
combined to create a Butterworth passband, which
attenuates frequencies outside a specific range,
rather than cutoff. For instance, in the example
above, a Butterworth passband with a range
between 0.5 Hz and 10 Hz would allow both
frequencies to pass, since both 1 Hz and 10 Hz fall
within that range, while a passband range between
0.5 Hz and 5 Hz would only remove the higher
frequency (10 Hz) from the data. Furthermore, the
Butterworth filter also depends on a polynomial
order, which is provided as a parameter. The order
defines the degree of attenuation of the frequencies
that fall outside the defined cutoff or range. In
general, high polynomial orders (i.e., degree 9
or 10) tend to completely remove out-of-range
frequencies, while low polynomial orders (i.e.,
1 or 2) attenuate those frequencies to a lesser
degree. Initially, the proposed model uses a 5th
order polynomial, a mid-order polynomial that
attenuates frequencies outside the passband range
without fully removing them. In order to use
Butterworth filters, the data must be first converted
from time to frequency domain, using Fourier
transforms. The conversion allows the data to be
analyzed by looking at the frequency distribution
of the signal, rather than its behavior as a function
of time. Moreover, when a signal is transformed
to the frequency domain, it is possible to visualize
the data in a continuous wavelet transform (CWT)
plot, also known as a magnitude scalogram. The
CWT is a tool used to analyze the time-varying
frequency characteristics of signals (Sadowsky,
1994). In other words, the CWT displays the
signal frequency and magnitude as a function of
time. Figure 5 shows a CWT graph displaying
the frequency distribution of a Cobalt-60 signal,
through a period of 180 seconds. Note that by
visualizing the CWT figure (right) it is possible
to determine that the signal experienced high
magnitudes between seconds 95 and 120, especially
in the lower frequencies. This is not visible in the
raw data (left) when the simulation is examined in
the time domain.

Figure 5: Raw data (top) of a Uranium-235 simulation, and its continuous
wavelet transform plot (bottom). The CWT plots were generated with
MATLAB's Continuous 1-D wavelet transform function.

Continuous wavelet transform plots are
convenient to determine the specific frequency
thresholds that define the passband range of the
Butterworth filter. For example, in the CWT plot
shown in Figure 5, a passband range between
0 Hz and 1 Hz would attenuate the noisy
high frequencies at which the signatures of the
radioactive source are not visible. Upon filtering
out those frequencies, the data can be converted
back to a time-domain and can be visualized in a
time-energy plot.
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time) is known for the simulations in the training
dataset, it is possible to determine the precision
of the signal processing model by comparing the
detection and target times, as follows:

The last step of the proposed method is to
implement a simple moving average (SMA). The
SMA technique is used to remove small oscillations
that are not representative of the general trend
of the signal and is applied mainly for data
visualization purposes. The resulting plot (Figure
6) shows a noticeable energy-deviation peak at the
time when the radiation detector was close to the
radioactive source (t = 108.4s for the Cobalt 60
example).

Terror was computed for 4,800 simulations
(800 simulations of each source) to determine the
effectiveness of the model at detecting distinct
types of radioactive sources.
2.

Radiation characterization
Radiation detection algorithms must also
be capable of identifying types of radioactive
sources. The threat that each radioactive isotope
poses to humans is different, and therefore,
radiation detectors must discern medical/
industrial isotopes from weapons-grade material.
For example, 131I and 99mTc are often used for
medical purposes, and thus, radiation detectors
may indicate the presence of radiation when
they are close to patients who are going through
certain medical treatments, like chemotherapy.
On the other hand, it is imperative for a radiation
detection algorithm to identify dangerous isotopes
(e.g., weapons-grade plutonium - WGPu) without
failure, to avoid catastrophic consequences. The
method presented in this section uses artificial
neural networks to identify six types of radioactive
sources from the dataset. The model uses energy
spectrum data to identify features that indicate
the presence of a specific radioactive isotope. The
purpose of developing a deep learning model is
to complement the signal processing technique
previously discussed, and to enhance the detection
and identification of radioactive isotopes by
combining both methods.
Figure 6: CWT plot with Butterworth cutoff values (top) and the
resulting time vs. energy plot in the time domain (bottom) upon applying
the Butterworth filter and a simple moving average (SMA).

The artificial neural network developed in
this project uses energy spectrum data to classify
isotopes. The energy spectrum, or gamma-ray
spectrum, is one of the key distinctive features
of radiological sources and it is described by the
number of photons (count-rate) detected by a NaI
scintillator during a time interval, as a function of

The resulting plot can be used to identify
the time at which the maximum energy deviation
occurred – or detection time. Since the real time
when the detector was closest to the source (target
6
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photon energy (Ghawaly, et al., 2020). For
example, if the radiation device detects 40 photons
with energies between 100keV and 102keV during
a period of 5 seconds, the count rate for the 100102 kEv energy bin would be 8 (40 events divided
by 5 seconds = 8 per second). Figure 7 shows the
energy spectra of 60Co and 235U.To train the
neural network, the original dataset was processed
to obtain the energy spectrum of each training
simulation at the time when the radiation detector
was near the radiological source (target time). A
window of five seconds before the target time was
used to obtain the gamma-ray spectrum of each
source. Moreover, the energy levels were divided
into 1500 energy bins, each containing the count
rate of a 2 keV range.

The energy spectrum of radioactive sources
is used for classification tasks because it contains
features that are particular to each element. For
example, the 60Co isotope is characterized for its
two prominent peaks between 1000 and 1500
keV, which can be visualized in Figure 7. Neural
networks use such distinctive features to discern
and classify isotopes.
The neural network model created for
this project was trained to identify six types
of radioactive sources, using a multi-layer
architecture. The network takes 1500 data points
as inputs (x), each representing the count rate
of a 2 kEv photon-energy bin. The weights and
bias values, which are the model parameters, were
obtained by training the neural network with
3,600 simulations from the dataset, which included
800 simulations of each radioactive source. The
output layer of the network contains 6 neurons,
each returning a probability corresponding to
a specific radioactive isotope. For any given
input, the output neuron returning the highest
probability corresponds to the radioactive source
identified by the neural network. The process is
summarized in Figure 8.
Moreover, the neural network was
complemented with an algorithm that generates
gamma-ray spectrum data every second
and delivers it to the deep learning model.
Consequently, the model can be used to detect and
identify radioactive isotopes on a rolling basis in
continuous datasets.

Figure 7: Energy spectrum of Cobalt-60 (top) and High Enriched
Uranium-HEU (right).
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desired since they suggest that the model can
detect radioactive sources in a timely manner.
Moreover, large Terror values (i.e., more than 10
seconds) returned by the model indicate that the
maximum energy deviation in a simulation was not
observed near the target time, which implies that
the radiation event was undetected by the model.
Thus, simulations with Terror values of less than 10
seconds were denoted as “detection events”. Table
1 shows the percentage of detection events, as well
as their average time error for each radioactive
isotope.
Source

Simulations
Tested

Detection
within 10
seconds of
target time
(detection
events)

Average
Terror (s) of
detection
events

Uranium

800

741 (92.6%) 1.27

Plutonium

800

488 (61.0%) 2.62

Iodine

800

429 (53.6%) 2.88

Cobalt

800

728 (91.0%) 1.09

Technetium

800

604 (75.5%) 2.01

HEU+Tech

800

714 (89.3%) 1.42

Total

4800

37094
(77.2%)

1.88

Table 1: Average time error of the model (detection time minus target
time) for each radioactive isotope.

In general, the model was accurate at
detecting uranium, cobalt, and technetium
isotopes, with more than 75% of the simulations
being detection events. Conversely, the model
failed to detect strong energy deviations in
plutonium and iodine simulations, with only 61%
and 54% of the radiation events being detected
within 10 seconds of the target time, respectively.
Moreover, the results show that the precision of
the model also varies with the type of radioactive
source being tested. Out of the 3704 detection
events, the average time error (difference between
detection time and target time) was higher for
plutonium and iodine than for uranium and
cobalt. This indicates that the model is not only
more capable of detecting uranium and cobalt but
can also detect such sources more rapidly.

Figure 8: Radioactive source classification using an artifical neural
network.

Results
The signal processing model was tested
using 4,800 simulations from the data set (800 per
radioactive source). Upon processing, detrending,
and filtering the data, the time difference (Terror)
between the model detection time and the target
time (real event time) of each simulation was
computed, using Equation (1). Since the goal of
the signal processing model is to detect radioactive
sources in a precise way, low values of Terror are
8
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The network then returned the 6 probabilities
corresponding to each radioactive isotope. A
confidence level of 95% was used as a threshold,
meaning that if a probability corresponding to a
certain isotope surpassed 95%, the neural network
would alert the detection of such radioactive
source. Conversely, if none of the probabilities
returned by the model reached the required
confidence level, the model would indicate the
absence of radiation. Table 2 summarizes the
results of the deep learning model in the form
of a confusion matrix. As seen in the table, most
of misclassified instances were either uranium
or technetium events that were identified as
HEU+Tech (the modified isotope that is composed
of both elements).

Another way of visualizing the results is by
looking at the percentage of simulations of each
isotope that had a time error (Terror) of less than
a particular time threshold. Figure 9 shows the
percentage of simulations that were detected within
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 10 seconds of the target time for
each of the six radioactive sources.

Figure 9: Radioactive events detected within a particular time (in seconds)
from the target time.

Once again, Figure 9 shows that the
precision of the signal processing model depends
on the type of source. For instance, radiation
was detected within 5 seconds of the target
time in 88.4% and 87.4% of 235U and 60Co
cases, respectively. Conversely, within the same
time threshold, radiation was detected in only
40.9% and 49.8% of the Iodine and Plutonium
simulations.

Table 2: Confusion matrix- Neral network isotope classification using
gamma-ray spectrum data. or see appendix 1

Finally, this study aimed to combine the
signal processing and neural network models, so
that they could be used complementary to detect
and identify isotopes. A graphical user interface
(GUI) was developed to visualize the output of
both models while processing the same simulation.
Figure 10 shows the output of the GUI for the
60Co simulation previously discussed, which has a
target time of t = 108.4 seconds.

The performance of the neural network
model was also evaluated. The neural network
was trained using a 75-25 split of the data, using
the same 4,800 simulations, 800 per radioactive
source. Since the main goal of the artificial neural
network is to classify radioactive isotopes, the
testing algorithm focused testing if the network
could find isotope signatures in gamma-ray spectra
at the target time. Therefore, for testing purposes,
the original simulations were reduced to include
only 10 seconds of data around the target time
(5 seconds before and 5 seconds after). Then, for
each simulation, the neural network model was
tested continuously across the 10-second interval.
9
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between t=113s and t=125s.

Discussion

The results of the signal processing
technique show that the model’s accuracy is highly
dependent on the type of radioactive source. In
general, 235U, 60Co and 99mTc are easier to detect
than 239Pu and 131I. Likewise, the precision of the
model is source-dependent since some isotopes
are detected by the model in a shorter time span
than others. For example, 60Co is detected, on
average, within 1.09 seconds of the target time,
while the mean detection time of 131I is almost 3
seconds. Since the model obtains the detection
time from the maximum energy deviation (see
Figure 6), it is possible that radioactive sources
with low detection rates (e.g., 131I) do not
generate significant deviations that can reveal the
presence of radiation. Thus, further work must be
undertaken to recognize the intrinsic differences
between radioactive sources that lead to easier
detection of certain isotopes over others, as well
as to understand the physical significance of such
differences.
On the other hand, it is important to note
that the parameters of the Butterworth filter may
be further optimized to enhance the performance
of the detection algorithm. One of the parameters
that can be revised is the filter’s polynomial order.
The proposed model uses a 5th order polynomial,
which attenuates frequencies outside a passband
range without fully eliminating them. The reason
why a 5th order polynomial is used is that some
radiation signatures may be present outside the
defined passband range, and therefore, by using
a mid-order polynomial, out-of-range radiation
features are attenuated but not fully ignored.
However, the model can be further optimized since
it has not been tested with different polynomial
degrees. For instance, the order can be increased to
filter out more noise frequencies (Kim), with the
downside that frequencies outside the passband
range (which may have useful radiation signatures)
will be fully removed by the filter.

Figure 10: GUI showing the output of the nerual network model (left)
and signal processing algorithm (right) while processing cobalt-60 simulation
with a target time of 108.4s.

The left image shows the output of the
machine learning model, showing the maximum
probability computed by the neural network every
second. When such confidence surpasses the 95%
threshold, the GUI displays the radioactive source
identified by the model. Likewise, the right figure
shows the output of the signal processing model,
showing energy deviations as a function of time.
Additionally, the model displays a note every time
a new maximum energy deviation is found. For
instance, in the 60Co sample, a maximum energy
deviation was found at t = 112s, 3.6 seconds after
the target time (108.4s). Similarly, the artificial
neural network identified 60Co eight times,
10
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Another important input parameter is
the Butterworth filter’s passband range, which
stipulates the frequencies that are used to detect
radiation signatures. The signal processing model
was initially tested using a passband range between
0 Hz and 1 Hz, as shown in Figure 6. Such range
was defined by visualizing a variety of simulations
in the frequency domain using the continuous
wavelet transform plots. The lower and upper
limits of the passband range have a major impact
in the precision of the algorithm, and therefore,
further work must be carried out to determine the
interval that provides the optimal performance.
Moreover, the model could be improved by
defining if distinct passband ranges could be used
for different radioactive isotopes. For instance,
239
U and 60Co were easily identified using a 0-1Hz
passband range and a Butterworth filter polynomial
order of 5th degree. However, the performance
of the model on the 239Pu and 131I isotopes may
improve if different parameters are used.

Furthermore, a factor that may impact
the performance of both models is shielding. As
previously mentioned, isotopes were shielded with
lead material in some simulations. A radioactive
source that is shielded may be more difficult to
detect and identify by an algorithm, since less
gamma rays will reach the radiation scintillator,
resulting in a different gamma-ray spectrum.
However, the original dataset does not contain
information about the level of shielding which
isotopes were subject to in each specific simulation.
Thus, the present study could not determine
whether the signal processing and neural network
model’s performance was significantly different
for shielded radioactive material, as compared to
unshielded sources.

Conclusion

This study presents two methods for
radioactive isotope detection and identification.
The first method uses signal processing techniques
to remove the trend and noise from the data,
and to expose energy deviations that indicate the
presence of radiation. On the other hand, the
machine learning model uses an artificial neural
network to classify isotopes.

On the other hand, the neural network
model was highly accurate at classifying radioactive
isotopes. In fact, radioactive sources were correctly
characterized in 92.6% of the cases. Out of the
7.4% of the misclassified cases, almost 3% were
235
U and 99mTc simulations that were erroneously
categorized in the 235U + 99mTc class (which is a
combination of both isotopes), and vice versa.
Thus, a way to enhance the performance of the
neural network by 3% is to improve its ability to
discern between events where a single radioactive
isotope is present (e.g., 235U) from events where
multiple sources are being detected by the NaI
scintillator (e.g., 235U + 99mTc). Such enhancement
could be feasible with more training data.
Alternatively, techniques such as data augmentation
could also provide more training samples without
the need of running more simulations. Moreover,
out of the 7.4% of misclassified events, a further
2% pertained to undetected 99mTc samples. Thus,
future enhancements of the neural network model
should also focus on improving the ability of the
model to identify signatures of the 99mTc isotope
from the gamma-ray spectra data.

The study proposes the use of both
methods to create an end-to-end model that can
detect and identify radioactive sources in urban
environments. The models were trained and
tested using 4,800 simulations, which included
radiation events of six different radioactive sources:
uranium-235 (235U), plutonium-239 (239Pu),
iodione-131 (131I), cobalt-60 (60Co), technetium-99
(99mTc), and a combination of uranium-235 and
technetium-99 (235U +99mTc).
The signal processing model was successful
at detecting certain types of radioactive isotopes,
such as 235U and 60Co. However, the model did not
perform well at detecting the 131I and 239Pu isotopes.
Further work must be done to understand the
physical differences in radioactive isotopes that
may lead to a superior performance of the model
at detecting certain isotopes over others. Moreover,
the model can be further enhanced by tuning
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the parameters of the detrending and filtering
algorithms, which include the filter polynomial
order, the passband range, and the detrending
technique. Overall, the signal processing model
detection rate was 77.2%, with most of the
undetected cases corresponding to 131I and 239Pu
simulations.

(2021). A comparative study of machine learning
methods for automated identification of radioisotopes
using NaI gamma-ray spectra. Nuclear Engineering and
Technology.
Ghawaly, J., Nicholson, A., Peplow, D., AndersonCook, D., Myers, K., Archer, D., . . . Quiter, B. (2020).
Data for training and testing radiation detection
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On the other hand, the neural network
model was highly successful at characterizing
radioactive sources. The model properly
identified isotopes in 92.6% of the tested
simulations. The performance of the model may
be improved by using more training data or using
a data augmentation technique. In general, the
neural network’s performance was limited at
differentiating events with a single radioactive
isotope (e.g., 235U) from those with a combination
of sources (i.e., 235U + 99mTc). The model could
also be further improved by knowing the shielding
characteristics of each simulation, which are not
provided in the original dataset.

Gomez-Fernandez, M., Wong, W.-K., Tokuhiro,
A., Welter, K., Alhawsawi, A., Yang, H., & Higley,
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Makhijani, A. (1997, 02). Plutonium as an Energy
Source. Retrieved from IEER: https://www.ieer.org/
ensec/no-1/puuse.html

Finally, this study proposes the integration
of both models through a GUI, which shows the
continuous output of the signal processing and
neural network models in parallel, allowing a
radiation detector to perform the detection and
characterization tasks at the same time.
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resource for exploring and terraforming Mars: https://
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